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Abstract This paper explores the role of inequity aversion as an explanation for
observed behavior in experimental Cournot oligopolies. We show that inequity aver-
sion can change the nature of the strategic interaction: quantities are strategic substi-
tutes for sufficiently asymmetric output levels but strategic complements otherwise.
We find that inequity aversion can explain why: (i) some experiments result in higher
than Cournot–Nash production levels while others result in lower, (ii) collusion often
occurs with only two players whereas with three or more players market outcomes are
very close to Cournot–Nash, and (iii) players often achieve equal profits in asymmetric
Cournot oligopoly.
Keywords Inequity aversion · Cournot oligopoly · Experiments
JEL Classification D43 · D63 · L13 · L21
1 Introduction
Although quantity-setting oligopoly is one of the “workhorse models” of industrial
organization, experimentally there is much ambiguity about its outcome. A recent
survey by Georgantzis (2006) indicates that many experimental Cournot oligopoly
games reject the hypothesis that the outcome is in line with the Cournot–Nash equilib-
rium of the corresponding one-shot game. Interestingly, however, outcomes on both
sides of the Cournot–Nash outcome are found: some experiments result in higher
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than Cournot–Nash production levels while others result in lower production levels
(Holt 1995).1
Why does the theory perform poorly in the experiments? One possibility is that
players are averse to inequality in earnings, that is, they are concerned about their own
material payoff but also about the consequences of their acts on payoff distributions.
Inequity aversion has been shown to explain a broad range of data for many different
games. The clearest evidence for these type of preferences comes from bargaining
and trust games. For example, in ultimatum games offers are usually much more
generous than predicted by subgame perfect equilibrium, and low offers are often
rejected. According to the inequity aversion explanation, these offers are consistent
with an equilibrium in which players make offers knowing that other players may
reject allocations that appear unfair.2
In this paper, we study formally the role of inequity aversion on Cournot competi-
tion. We assume that a player cares about her own monetary payoff and, in addition,
would like to reduce the difference between her payoff and those of her rivals. More
specifically, a inequity averse player dislikes advantageous inequity: she feels com-
passion towards her rivals when the average material payoff of her rivals is smaller
than her own material payoff. In addition, an inequity averse player also dislikes dis-
advantageous inequity: she feels envy towards her rivals when the average material
payoff of her rivals is greater than her own material payoff.
We find that inequity aversion can change the nature of the strategic interaction:
quantities are strategic substitutes when players choose asymmetric output levels but
strategic complements when they choose similar output levels. This can give rise
to a continuum of equilibria. We show that the set of Nash equilibria of Cournot
competition with inequity averse players changes monotonically with compassion
and envy. If players’ degree of envy increases, then the largest Nash equilibria of the
Cournot game moves closer to the Walrasian outcome. In contrast, if players’ degree
of compassion increases, then the smallest Nash equilibria of the Cournot game moves
closer to the collusive outcome. However, as the number of players grows the impact
of inequity aversion vanishes. This happens because it takes only one self-interested
player to destroy the continuum of equilibria generated by inequity aversion.
We find that relatively low levels of inequity aversion generate less asymmetries
in profits than those predicted when self-interested players play asymmetric Cournot
oligopolies. We also show that relatively high levels of inequity aversion can explain
why often players attain equal profits in asymmetric experimental Cournot oligopolies.
The intuition for this result is straightforward. For relatively high levels of inequity
aversion, attaining asymmetric profits imposes inequity costs that are too high in
relation to the material benefits.
1 A rather general finding in finitely repeated symmetric experimental Cournot oligopoly is that, while
some learning occurs during the session, in many sessions total output is not significantly different from the
collusive prediction, while in other sessions, total output oscilates between the collusive and the Cournot
outcome. In addition, in finitely repeated asymmetric experimental Cournot oligopoly, subjects’ strategies
fail to converge towards the Nash equilibrium prediction. See Rassenti et al. (2000) and Huck et al. (2000,
2001).
2 Camerer (2003) and Sobel (2005) provide excellent reviews of this literature.
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Our findings are more relevant in experimental Cournot oligopolies with a small
number of players. In fact, we show that increasing the number of players reduces
the impact of inequity aversion on Cournot oligopoly. This finding is consistent with
Huck et al. (2004) who find some collusion with two firms and no collusion as the
number reaches four firms. Our findings are also more relevant in experimental Cournot
oligopolies where individuals rather than teams play the role of firms. Hildenbrand
(2012) studies a Stackelberg experiment in which the firms are either represented by
individuals or teams. He finds that individuals exhibit more inequity aversion than
teams.3
This paper is related to a recent strand of literature in economics that studies the
consequences of relaxing the assumption of pure self interest. Rabin (1993) is the first
using fairness considerations in game theory. Sappington and Desiraju (2007) study
inequity aversion in adverse selection contexts. Biel (2008) studies how the optimal
incentive contract in team production is affected when workers are averse to inequity.
Santos-Pinto (2008) shows that inequity aversion is able to organize several exper-
imental regularities of endogenous timing games. Englmaier and Wambach (2010)
study optimal contracts when the agent suffers from being better off or worse off than
the principal.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets-up the model. Section 3 characterizes
equilibria of Cournot oligopoly with symmetric costs and inequity averse players.
Section 4 considers Cournot oligopoly with asymmetric costs. Section 5 concludes
the paper. All proofs are in the Appendix.
2 The model
Many experiments indicate that individuals are motivated not only by material self-
interest, but also by the distribution of payoffs. We incorporate this possibility in the
Cournot oligopoly game by assuming that players are averse to inequality in profits.
There are two main theories of inequity aversion: Fehr and Schmidt’s (1999) and
Bolton and Ockenfels (2000). According to Fehr and Schmidt, a player cares about
his own payoff and dislikes absolute payoff differences between his own payoff and
the payoff of any other player.4
According to Bolton and Ockenfels’s (2000), an inequity averse player is concerned
with both his own payoff and his relative share of the total group payoff. So, a player
would be equally happy if all players received the same payoff or if some were rich
and some were poor as long as he received the average payoff, while according to Fehr
and Schmidt (1999) he would clearly prefer that all players get the same.5
3 Charness and Sutter (2012) review the group versus individual behavior experiments for variety of games
and documented that groups behave more rationally and have stronger self-interested preferences.
4 Neilson (2006) provides an axiomatic foundation for Fehr and Schmidt (1999).
5 Bolton and Ockenfels’s (2000) payoff function is Ui (π) = v(πi , πi /
∑n
j=1 π j ), where v is assumed
to be globally non-decreasing and concave in the first argument, to be strictly concave in the second
argument (relative payoff), and to satisfy v(πi , 1/n) = 0 for all πi . This type of inequity aversion has no
impact on equilibrium outcomes in symmetric Cournot games. This result is driven by the assumption that
v(πi , 1/n) = 0 for all πi .
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We follow Fehr and Schmidt’s (1999) approach to model inequity aversion. Con-
sider a Cournot oligopoly with n players where the profit of player i is the difference
between revenue and cost, that is,
πi (qi , Q−i ) = Ri (qi , Q−i ) − Ci (qi ) = P(Q)qi − Ci (qi ),
where Ri (qi , Q−i ) is revenue, Ci (qi ) is the cost of production, and P(Q) is the
inverse market demand with Q = ∑ qi . We assume that P(Q) is strictly positive
on some bounded interval (0, Q¯) with P(Q) = 0 for Q ≥ Q¯. We also assume
that P(Q) is twice continuously differentiable with P ′(Q) < 0 (in the interval for
which P(Q) > 0). Players costs of production are assumed to be twice continuously
differentiable with C ′i (qi ) ≥ 0. It is also assumed that the decreasing marginal revenue
property holds, that is, P ′(Q)+P ′′ (Q) qi < 0 (this implies that quantities are strategic
substitutes). Furthermore, we assume that P ′(Q)−C ′′i (qi ) ≤ 0 (this implies the profit
function is strictly concave).
According to Fehr and Schmidt (1999), the payoff function of player i is
Ui (πi , π−i )=πi −
⎡
⎣ αi
n − 1
∑
j =i
max
(
π j − πi , 0
) + βi
n − 1 max
∑
j =i
(
πi − π j , 0
)
⎤
⎦ .
(1)
The terms in the square bracket are the payoff effects of compassion βi and envy
αi . We see that if player i’s profits are greater than the average profits of its rivals then
player i feels compassion towards its rivals. However, if player i’s profits are smaller
than the average profits of its rivals then player i feels envious of his rivals.6 This
model of inequity aversion has piecewise linear indifference curves over a player’s
own profits and its rivals’ profits.
Player i’s inequity aversion towards its rivals is characterized by the pair of para-
meters (αi , βi ) , i = 1, 2, . . . , n .7 player i exhibits strict inequity aversion when both
αi and βi are strictly greater than zero. player i only cares about maximizing profits
when αi = βi = 0. In all other cases player is (weakly) averse to inequity. We assume
that αi and βi , i = 1, . . . , n, are common knowledge. Let α = (α1, . . . , αn) and
β = (β1, . . . , βn) .
Fehr and Schmidt assume that the dislike of disadvantageous inequity is stronger
than that of advantageous inequity, i.e. αi > βi and that βi is smaller than 1. We make
no assumptions about the relation between αi and βi but we assume, like Fehr and
Schmidt, that βi is smaller than 1.
6 When there are only two players in the market, player i’s payoff function becomes Ui (πi , π j ) =
πi −
[
αi max
(
π j − πi , 0
) + βi max
(
πi − π j , 0
)]
, i = j = 1, 2.
7 Alternatively, we could have assumed that player i has different feelings of compassion and envy towards
each rival. To simplify the analysis, we assume that player i feels the same degree of compassion and envy
towards all rivals.
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3 Equilibria with symmetric costs
In this section, we characterize the impact of inequity aversion on Cournot oligopoly
with symmetric costs. Our first result characterizes the best reply of an inequity averse
player.
Proposition 1 The best reply of player i in a Cournot oligopoly with symmetric costs
and inequity averse players is
ri (Q−i ) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
si (Q−i ), if 0 ≤ Q−i ≤ (n − 1)q(βi )
Q−i
n−1 , if (n − 1)q (βi ) ≤ Q−i ≤ (n − 1)q(αi )
ti (Q−i ), if (n − 1)q(αi ) ≤ Q−i
, (2)
where
si (Q−i ) = arg maxqi
⎡
⎣(1 − βi ) πi (qi , Q−i ) + βi
n − 1
∑
j =i
π j (qi , Q−i )
⎤
⎦ ,
ti (Q−i ) = arg maxqi
⎡
⎣(1 + αi ) πi (qi , Q−i ) − αi
n − 1
∑
j =i
π j (qi , Q−i )
⎤
⎦ ,
q(βi ) is the solution to (1 − βi )
[
P(nq) − C ′(q)] + P ′(nq)q = 0, and q(αi ) is the
solution to (1 + αi )
[
P(nq) − C ′(q)] + P ′(nq)q = 0.
The best reply has three different segments. When the rivals produce low output
levels the best reply has a negative slope and consists of a smaller output than the
output of a self-interested player due to compassion. However, when the rivals produce
intermediate output levels the best reply has a positive slope and consists in producing
the average output level of the rivals. Finally, when the rivals produce high output
levels the best reply has a negative slope and consists of a larger output level than the
output a self-interested player due to envy.
We see that the best reply of an inequity averse player is continuous like the best
reply of self-interested player. However, the best reply of an inequity averse player
is non-monotonic, whereas a self-interested player has a monotonic best reply. Thus,
under inequity aversion quantities are strategic substitutes over low and high output
levels of the rivals but strategic complements over intermediate output levels of the
rivals.
Proposition 2 The set of Nash equilibria of a Cournot oligopoly with symmetric costs
and inequity averse players is
N I A = {(q1, . . . , qn) : qi = q j , ∀i = j, and q(β) ≤ qi ≤ q(α), i = 1, . . . , n
}
,
where q(β) = max [q (β1) , . . . , q(βn)] , and q(α) = min [q(α1), . . . , q(αn)] .
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Proposition 2 tells us that if all players are averse to inequity, then there is a con-
tinuum of equilibria in a Cournot oligopoly with symmetric costs. The smallest Nash
equilibrium is determined by the preferences of the player with the highest level of
compassion and the largest Nash equilibrium is determined by the preferences of the
player with the lowest level of envy. Proposition 2 also tells that the market output
with inequity averse players may be higher or lower than the market output with
self-interested players. This depends on players’ degree of envy and compassion.
Proposition 3 The smallest Nash equilibrium of a Cournot oligopoly with symmetric
costs and inequity averse players is a nonincreasing function of β. The largest Nash
equilibrium is a nondecreasing function of α.
This result characterizes the impact of compassion and envy on the set of Nash
equilibria of the Cournot oligopoly with inequity averse players. It tells us that an
increase in compassion reduces the market output produced in the smallest Nash
equilibria with inequity averse players. This result is quite intuitive. In fact, Fehr
and Schmidt’s (1999) payoff function implies that if player i has a higher monetary
payoff than the average payoff of his opponents and βi = 1/2, then player i is just
as willing to keep one dollar to himself as to give it to his rivals. If all players have
similar preferences, then they act as if they are maximizing the joint profit, ∑πi . So, if
βi = 1/2, for all i , then compassion leads to the best collusive outcome.8 In contrast,
an increase in envy raises the market output produced in the largest Nash equilibria
with inequity averse players.
Propositions 2 and 3 show that inequity aversion can change qualitatively the predic-
tions of a symmetric Cournot oligopoly. In the benchmark game with self-interested
players (αi = βi = 0, for all i) there is a unique Nash equilibrium. Proposition 2
shows that inequity aversion can give rise to a multiplicity of symmetric equilibria.
Proposition 3 shows that compassion can generate collusive outcomes in Cournot mar-
kets whereas envy can generate perfectly competitive outcomes. The existence of a
multiplicity of equilibria might be the reason why in many experiments with Cournot
duopolies outcomes fall on both sides of the Cournot prediction and may range from
perfectly collusive to relatively competitive (Holt 1995).
Huck et al. (2004) review the literature on the role of the number of players on the
outcome of Cournot oligopolies with symmetric costs. They find that (pp. 440) “(. . .)
collusion sometimes occurs in duopolies and is very rare in markets with more than two
firms. On average, total outputs in markets with more than two firms slightly exceed
the Cournot prediction.” They also test for number effects in oligopoly in a unified
economic frame and find that (p. 443) “ collusion sometimes occurs with two firms.
For three-firm oligopolies Nash equilibrium seems to be a good predictor. Markets
with four or more firms are never collusive and typically settle around the Cournot
8 Experimental evidence shows that the amount of collusion observed in repeated Cournot oligopoly
depends on communication, playing with the same rival(s) and the size of the market. Daughety and Forsythe
(1987a,b) report that face to face nonbinding groups discussions increase price in repeated Cournot games
in which the quantity decision are made afterwards. Similarly, Isaac et al. (1984) report that posted-offer
prices are increased when sellers are given chance to meet face to face prior to each period. Holt (1985) finds
that collusion occurs only when the same subjects are matched in fixed groups for the entire experiment.
With random matching the Cournot–Nash solution is a good prediction.
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outcome while some of them are very competitive with outputs close to the Walrasian
outcome.” Our next result shows that these findings are consistent with our model.
Proposition 4 Assume that αi and βi , for all i, are drawn from a uniform distribution
with support on [0, 1] . As the number of players increases, the set of Nash equilibria
of a Cournot oligopoly with symmetric costs and inequity averse players converges
to the unique Nash equilibrium of a Cournot oligopoly with symmetric costs and
self-interested players.
This result shows that increasing the number of players reduces the impact of
inequity aversion on the set of Nash equilibria of a Cournot oligopoly with symmetric
costs. This happens because when there are n players, the smallest Nash equilibrium
of the game is determined by the preferences of the player with the lowest degree of
compassion. Similarly, the largest Nash equilibrium of the game is determined by the
player with the lowest degree of envy. If the levels of compassion and envy of each
player are drawn from a uniform distribution with support on [0, 1] , then an increase
in the number of players makes it more likely that the lowest level of compassion as
well as the lowest level of envy are both very close to zero. Thus, as the number of
players increases the smallest and the largest Nash equilibria of a Cournot oligopoly
with symmetric costs and inequity averse players converge to the Nash equilibrium of
a Cournot oligopoly with symmetric costs and self-interested players.
4 Equilibria with asymmetric costs
In this section, we analyze the impact of inequity aversion on Cournot oligopoly with
asymmetric costs. To simplify the analysis, let n = 2. Furthermore, suppose that there
are no fixed costs and that player 1 has a lower marginal cost than player 2, that is,
C ′1(q) < C ′2(q) for all q.
Players will attain equal profits when π1(q1, q2) = π2(q1, q2) or
P(q1 + q2)(q2 − q1) = C2(q2) − C1(q1). (3)
Denote the solution of (3) with respect to qi as qi = ei (q j ). The slope of the equal
profit curve is
dq2
dq1
= M R1 − C
′
1 − P ′q2
M R2 − C ′2 − P ′q1
. (4)
We see from (4) that if (q1, q2) is a point in the equal profit curve that satisfies M R1 −
C ′1 − P ′q2 > 0 and M R2 − C ′2 − P ′q1 > 0, then the slope of the equal profit
curve at that point is well-defined and positive. We assume from now on that the cost
asymmetry is not too high such that the equal profit curve has a positive slope at all
points (q1, q2) with q2 > q1.
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Proposition 5 The best reply of player i in a Cournot duopoly with asymmetric costs
and inequity averse players is
ri (q j ) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
si (q j ), i f 0 ≤ q j ≤ e j (qi (βi ))
ei (q j ), i f e j (qi (βi )) ≤ q j ≤ e j (qi (αi ))
ti (q j ), i f e j (qi (αi )) ≤ q j
, (5)
where
si (q j ) = arg maxqi
[
(1 − βi ) πi (qi , q j ) + βiπ j (qi , q j )
]
,
ti (q j ) = arg maxqi
[
(1 + αi ) πi (qi , q j ) − αiπ j (qi , q j )
]
,
qi (βi ) is the solution to
(1 − βi )
[
P ′(qi + e j (qi ))qi + P(qi + e j (qi )) − C ′i (qi )
]
+βi P ′(qi + e j (qi ))e j (qi ) = 0,
and qi (αi ) is the solution to
(1 + αi )
[
P ′(qi + e j (qi ))qi + P(qi + e j (qi )) − C ′i (qi )
]
−αi P ′(qi + e j (qi ))e j (qi ) = 0.
We see from (2) and (5) that the best reply of an inequity averse player in a Cournot
duopoly with asymmetric costs is qualitatively similar to the best reply of an inequity
averse player in a Cournot duopoly with symmetric costs. Quantities are strategic
substitutes for low and high output levels of the rival but strategic complements for
intermediate output levels of the rival. The only difference is that for intermediate out-
put levels inequity averse players wish to equalize profits. Since costs are asymmetric
it is not possible to equalize profits by producing the same output level of as the rival.
Thus, players will choose different output levels to equalize profits.
Proposition 6 Consider a Cournot duopoly where player 1 has lower marginal cost
than player 2 and players are inequity averse. If β1 and α2 are sufficiently small, that
is, q1(β1) ≥ e1(q2(α2)), then this game has a unique Nash equilibrium (q I A1 , q I A2 ),
which is the solution to q1 = s1(q2) and q2 = t2(q1). In this equilibrium: (i) player 1
feels compassion of player 2, (ii) player 2 feels envy of player 1, and (iii) q S2 < q I A2 <
q I A1 < q
S
1 , where (q
S
1 , q
S
2 ) is the Nash equilibrium of the game with self-interested
players.
This result says that if the low cost player has a small dislike of advantageous
inequity and the high cost player has a small dislike of disadvantageous inequity,
then the Cournot duopoly with asymmetric costs and inequity averse players has an
asymmetric Nash equilibrium where the low cost player attains a higher profit than
the high cost player. Furthermore, the inequity averse low cost player chooses a lower
output level than a low cost self-interested player and the inequity averse high cost
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player chooses a higher output than a high cost self-interested player. The intuition
behind this result is as follows.
A low cost player with a small dislike of advantageous inequity chooses a lower
output than a low cost self-interested player because she knows that in equilibrium she
will attain higher profits than her rival and this induces compassion towards the rival.
A high cost player with a small dislike of disadvantageous inequity chooses a higher
output than a high cost self-interested player because he knows that in equilibrium he
will attain lower profits than his rival and this induces envy towards the rival.
Proposition 7 Consider a Cournot duopoly where player 1 has lower marginal cost
than player 2 and players are inequity averse. If β1 and α2 are sufficiently large, that
is, q1(β1) < e1(q2(α2)), then the set of Nash equilibria of this game is
N I A = {(q1, q2) : π1(q1, q2) = π2(q1, q2), and q(β) ≤ q1 ≤ q(α)} , (6)
where q(β) = max [q1 (β1) , e1(q2(β2))] , and q(α) = min [q1(α1), e1(q2(α2))] .
Proposition 7 tells us that if the low cost player has a high dislike of advantageous
inequity and the high cost player has a high dislike of disadvantageous inequity, then the
Cournot duopoly with asymmetric costs and inequity averse players has a continuum
of asymmetric Nash equilibria where players attain equal profits.
Propositions 6 and 7 are consistent with experimental evidence on Cournot
oligopolies with asymmetric costs. Keser (1993) studies two stage duopoly games
with asymmetric costs and demand inertia. She finds that the high cost player has
higher profits and the low cost player lower profits than the self-interested subgame
perfect equilibrium profits. Selten et al. (1997) study a 20-period repeated Cournot
duopoly with asymmetric costs and find that players often try to achieve equal profits.
5 Conclusion
This paper studies the impact of inequity aversion on Cournot competition. We find
that inequity aversion can change the nature of the strategic interaction: quantities
are strategic substitutes when players choose asymmetric output levels but strategic
complements when they choose similar output levels. We show that inequity aver-
sion is able to organize at least three empirical regularities in experimental Cournot
oligopolies.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1 The quantity q(αi ) is the interception of ti (Q−i ) with the 45
degree line. From the definition of ti (Q−i ) we have
(1 + αi )
[
P ′(Q)qi + P(Q) − C ′(qi )
] − αi
n − 1
∑
j =i
P ′(Q)q j = 0.
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In a symmetric equilibrium, we have q1 = · · · = qn = q. So,
(1 + αi )
[
P ′(nq)q + P(nq) − C ′(q)] − αi P ′(nq)q = 0.
or
(1 + αi )
[
P(nq) − C ′(q)] + P ′(nq)q = 0.
Similarly, the quantity q(βi ) is the interception of si (Q−i ) with the 45◦ line. From the
definition of si (Q−i ), we have
(1 − βi )
[
P ′(Q)qi + P(Q) − C ′(qi )
] + βi
n − 1
∑
j =i
P ′(Q)q j = 0.
In a symmetric equilibrium, we have q1 = · · · = qn = q. So,
(1 − βi )
[
P ′(nq)q + P(nq) − C ′(q)] + βi P ′(nq)q = 0.
or
(1 − βi )
[
P(nq) − C ′(q)] + P ′(nq)q = 0.
We now show that q(αi ) is an increasing function of αi and q(βi ) a decreasing function
of βi for i = 1, . . . , n. Let
h(q, αi ) = (1 + αi )
[
P(nq) − C ′(q)] + P ′(nq)q = 0,
g(q, βi ) = (1 − βi )
[
P(nq) − C ′(q)] + P ′(nq)q = 0,
which imply
∂q
∂αi
= −∂h/∂αi
∂h/∂q
= − P(Q) − C
′(q)
(1 + n(1 + αi )) P ′(Q) + n P ′′(Q)q − C ′′i (q
> 0,
∂q
∂βi
= −∂g/∂βi
∂g/∂q
= − −
[
P(Q) − C ′(q)]
(1 + n(1 − βi )) P ′(Q) + n P ′′(Q)q − C ′′i (q)
< 0,
since P ′(Q) < 0, P ′(Q) ≤ 0, and C ′′(qi ) ≥ 0.
We will now show that qi = 1n−1
∑
j =i q j is a best response for player i when the
rivals produce
q Ni ≤ q¯ j ≤ q(αi ), (7)
where q¯ j = 1n−1
∑
j =i q j . To do that we will show that player i can not gain from
deviating from qi = q¯ j when (7) holds. Suppose, that (7) holds and that player i
produces qi = q¯ j + ε, with ε > 0. In this case player i’s payoff is
Ui = (1 − βi ) [P (Q) qi − C(qi )] + βi
n − 1
∑
j =i
[
P (Q) q j − C(q j )
]
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and the change in player i’s payoff from producing qi = q¯ j + ε, ε > 0, instead of q¯ j
is approximately equal to
dUi ≈ (1 − βi )
[
P ′ (Q) qi + P(Q) − C ′(qi )
] + βi
n − 1
∑
j =i
P ′ (Q) q j
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
qi =q¯ j
(ε)
= [(P ′ (nq¯ j
)
q¯ j + P(nq¯ j ) − C ′(q¯ j )
) − βi
(
P(nq¯ j ) − C ′(q¯ j )
)]
ε.
The square brackets are negative since qi = q¯ j > arg max [P (Q) qi − C(qi )] and
P(nq¯ j ) − C ′(q¯ j ) > 0. So, when (7) holds, player i can not gain by producing more
than q¯ j . Now, suppose that (7) holds and that player i produces qi = q¯ j + ε, with
ε < 0. In this case player i’s payoff is
Ui = (1 + αi ) [P (Q) qi − C(qi )] − αi
n − 1
∑
j =i
[
P (Q) q j − C(q j )
]
,
and the change in player i’s payoff from producing qi = q¯ j + ε, ε < 0, instead of q¯ j
is approximately equal to
dUi ≈ (1 + αi )
[
P ′ (Q) qi + P(Q) − C ′(qi )
] − αi
n − 1
∑
j =i
P ′ (Q) q j
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
qi =q¯ j
(ε)
= [(1 + αi )
[
P(nq¯ j ) − C ′(q¯ j )
] + P ′(nq¯ j )q¯ j
]
ε = h(q, αi )|q=q¯ j (ε) .
Since ε < 0, we have that sign dUi = −sign h(q, αi )|q=q¯ j . If q¯ j = q(αi ) we have
that sign dUi = 0. If q Ni ≤ q¯ j < q(αi ), the fact h(q, αi ) is a decreasing function
of q implies that h(q, αi )|q=q¯ j > 0, which in turn implies that sign dUi < 0. So,
when (7) holds, player i can not gain by producing less than q¯ j . From this result is
follows immediately that if player i’s rivals produce q(αi ) < 1n−1
∑
j =i q j , then the
best response of player i is given by ti (q−i ).
We will now show that qi = 1n−1
∑
j =i q j is a best response for player i when the
rivals produce
q(βi ) ≤ q¯ j ≤ q Ni , (8)
To do that we will show that player i can not gain from deviating from qi = q¯ j when
(8) holds. Suppose, that (8) holds and that player i produces qi = q¯ j + ε, with ε < 0.
In this case, player i’s payoff is given by
Ui = (1 + αi ) [P (Q) qi − C(qi )] − αi
n − 1
∑
j =i
[
P (Q) q j − C(q j )
]
,
and the change in player i’s payoff from producing qi = q¯ j + ε, ε < 0, instead of q¯ j
is approximately equal to
dUi ≈ (1 + αi )
[
P ′ (Q) qi + P(Q) − C ′(qi )
] − αi
n − 1
∑
j =i
P ′ (Q) q j
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
qi =q¯ j
(ε)
= [(1 + αi )
[
P ′(nq¯ j )q¯ j + P(nq¯ j ) − C ′(q¯ j )
] − αi P ′(nq¯ j )q¯ j
]
ε.
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The square brackets are positive since qi = q¯ j < arg max [P (Q) qi − C(qi )] and
P ′(nq¯ j ) < 0. So, when (8) holds, player i can not gain by producing less than q¯ j .
Now, suppose that (8) holds and that player i produces qi = q¯ j + ε, with ε > 0. In
this case player i’s payoff is given by
Ui = (1 − βi ) [P (Q) qi − C(qi )] + βi
n − 1
∑
j =i
[
P (Q) q j − C(q j )
]
and the change in player i’s payoff from producing qi = q¯ j + ε, ε > 0, instead of q¯ j
is approximately equal to
dUi ≈ (1 − βi )
[
P ′ (Q) qi + P(Q) − C ′(qi )
] + βi
n − 1
∑
j =i
P ′ (Q) q j
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
qi =q¯ j
(ε)
= [(1 − βi )
[
P(nq¯ j ) − C ′(q¯ j )
] + P ′ (nq¯ j
)
q¯ j
]
ε = g(q, βi )|q=q¯ j (ε) .
Since ε > 0, we have that sign dUi = sign g(q, βi )|q=q¯ j . If q¯ j = q(βi ) we have
that sign dUi = 0. If q(βi ) < q¯ j ≤ q Ni , the fact g(q, βi ) is a decreasing function of
q implies that g(q, βi )|q=q¯ j < 0, which in turn implies that sign dUi < 0. So, when(8) holds, player i can not gain by producing more than q¯ j . From this result is follows
immediately that if player i’s rivals produce 0 ≤ 1
n−1
∑
j =i q j < q(βi ), then the best
response of player i is given by si (q−i ). 	unionsq
Proof of Proposition 2 The proof proceeds in two steps. First we show that the set
of equilibria is non-empty. Second, we show that if all players are strictly averse to
inequality, then there is a continuum of equilibria and we characterize the largest and
the smallest one.
We now show that qi = q Ni is the best reply to q N−i =
(
q N1 , . . . , q
N
i−1, q
N
i+1, . . . q Nn
)
in the Cournot oligopoly with symmetric costs and inequity averse players. The welfare
of player 1 under outcome q N is π1(q N ) =
[
P
(
nq Ni
) − Ci (q Ni )
]
q Ni , where q
N
i =
argq1 max
[
P
(
qi + ∑ j =i q Nj
)
− Ci (qi )
]
qi .
If player i produces q Ni + ε, with ε > 0, and all other players produce q N−i , then
the change in player i’s profit is approximately equal to
dπi ≈ ε ∂πi/∂qi |qi =q Ni +
1
2
ε2 ∂2πi/∂q2i
∣
∣
∣
qi =q Ni
= 1
2
ε2
[
2P ′(QN ) + P ′′(QN )q Ni − C ′′(q Ni )
]
. (9)
The assumption that P ′ < 0, P ′′ ≤ 0, and C ′′ ≥ 0 imply that dπi < 0. The change
in the profit of one of player i’s rivals, say j , is approximately equal to
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dπ j ≈ ε ∂π j/∂qi
∣
∣
qi =q Ni +
1
2
ε2 ∂2π j/∂q2i
∣
∣
∣
qi =q Ni
= εP ′(QN )q Nj +
1
2
ε2 P ′′(QN )q Nj .
Note that the change in the average profit of player i’s rivals is the same as the change
in the profit of a single rival since
1
n − 1
∑
j =i
dπ j ≈ 1
n − 1εP
′(QN )
∑
j =i
q Nj +
1
2
ε2 P ′′(QN )
∑
j =i
q Nj
= εP ′(QN )q Nj +
1
2
ε2 P ′′(QN )q Nj . (10)
The assumption that P ′ < 0 and P ′′ ≤ 0 imply that 1
n−1
∑
j =i dπ j < 0. We see
from (9) and ( 10) that if player i produces q Ni + ε, with ε > 0, and all other players
produce q N−i , then there is a first order decrease in profits of player i and a second order
decrease in the average profit of player i’s rivals. Thus, if player i produces q Ni + ε,
with ε > 0, it suffers a loss in profits and also a loss from an increase in inequity
aversion given that the average profit of the rivals becomes smaller than player i’s
profit. If that is the case, then player i cannot gain by producing q Ni + ε, with ε > 0,
instead of producing q Ni .
If player i produces q Ni +ε, with ε < 0, and all other players produce q N−i , then the
change in player i’s profit is given by (9), and we have that dπi < 0. The change in the
average profit of player i’s rivals is given by (10), and we have that 1
n−1
∑
j =i dπ j > 0
since ε < 0 and the first term is of first order while the second term is of second order.
Thus, if player i produces q Ni + ε, with ε < 0, it suffers a loss in profits and also a
loss from an increase in inequity aversion given that the average profit of the rivals
becomes greater than player i’s profit. If that is the case, then player i can not gain by
producing q Ni + ε, with ε < 0, instead of producing q Ni . This proves that qi = q Ni is
the best reply to q N−i =
(
q N1 , . . . , q
N
i−1, q
N
i+1, . . . q Nn
)
and so q N is a Nash equilibrium
of a Cournot oligopoly with inequity averse players.
We now know that the set N I A is non-empty. We still need to show that if all
players are strictly averse to inequity, then q(β) < q(α), that is, N I A is an interval.
We know that q(αi ) is an increasing function of αi and that q(βi ) is a decreasing
function of βi for i = 1, . . . , n. Note that if at least one player does not feel inequity
aversion then q(β) = q(α), and N I A is a singleton. To see this suppose that player
i is not inequity averse, that is, αi = βi = 0. If that is the case, then h(q, αi ) = 0
and g(q, βi ) = 0 imply that q(0) = q N . If q(αi ) is an increasing function of αi and
q(0) = q N , then q(α) = q N . Similarly, if q(βi ) is a decreasing function of βi and
q(0) = q N , then q(β) = q N . So, if at least one player feels aversion to inequity
we have that q(β) = q(α) = q N = N I A. We will now show that if all players are
strictly averse to inequity, then q(β) < q(α), that is, N I A is an interval. If all players
are strictly averse to inequity, q(αi ) is an increasing function of αi and q(0) = q N ,
then q(α) > q N = q(0). Also, if all players are strictly inequity averse, q(αi ) is an
decreasing function of βi and q(0) = q N , then q(β) < q N = q(0). This shows that
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q(β) < q(α) when all players are strictly inequity averse, that is the set N I A is an
interval. All outcomes in the set N I A are equilibria of the symmetric Cournot game
with inequity aversion since for any profile of quantities, q−i , the quantity qi belongs
to the best response of player i , i = 1, . . . n. 	unionsq
Proof of Proposition 3 The quantity produced by each player in the largest Nash equi-
libria of N I A is given by q(α) = min [q(α1), . . . , q(αn)] . The largest Nash equilibria
of N I A is nondecreasing in α since min [q(α1), . . . , q(αn)] is nondecreasing in α.
Similarly, the quantity produced by each player in the smallest Nash equilibria of N I A
is given by q(β) = max [q(β1), . . . , q(βn)] . The smallest Nash equilibria of N I A is
nonincreasing in β since max [q(β1), . . . , q(βn)] is nonincreasing in β. 	unionsq
Proof of Proposition 4 When all players are strictly averse to inequity we have q(β) <
q N < q(α). Since αi is drawn from a uniform distribution with support on [0, 1] , the
larger is n the most likely it becomes that min (α1, . . . αn) is closer to zero, that is,
N (α) is closer to q N . Similarly, since βi is drawn from a uniform distribution with
support on [0, 1] , the larger is n the most likely it becomes that min (β1, . . . , βn) is
closer to zero, that is, that N (β) is closer to q N . 	unionsq
Proof of Proposition 5 The quantity qi (αi ) is the interception of ti (q j ) with the equal
profit curve. From the definition of ti (q j ) we have
(1 + αi )
[
P ′(Q)qi + P(Q) − C ′i (qi )
] − αi P ′(Q)q j = 0.
In the equal profit curve, we have q j = e j (qi ). So,
(1+αi )
[
P ′(qi +e j (qi ))qi +P(qi +e j (qi ))−C ′i (qi )
]−αi P ′(qi +e j (qi ))e j (qi )=0.
Similarly, the quantity qi (βi ) is the interception of si (q j ) with the equal profit curve.
From the definition of si (q j ) we have
(1 − βi )
[
P ′(Q)qi + P(Q) − C ′(qi )
] + βi P ′(Q)q j = 0.
In the equal profit curve, we have q j = e j (qi ). So,
(1−βi )
[
P ′(qi +e j (qi ))qi +P(qi +e j (qi ))−C ′i (qi )
]+βi P ′(qi +e j (qi ))e j (qi )=0.
The rest of the proof is similar to that of Proposition 1. 	unionsq
Proof of Proposition 6 It follows from e1(q2(α2)) ≤ q1(β1) that the best replies of
players 1 and 2 only intersect when q1 ≥ e1(q2(α2)) and q2 ≤ e2(q1(β1)). This
together with (5) implies that the Nash equilibrium is the solution to q1 = s1(q2) and
q2 = t2(q1). Hence, player 1 fells compassion of player 2 and player 2 feels envy of
player 1. It follows from the definitions of s1(q2) and t2(q1) that q S2 < q I A2 < q I A1 <
q S1 . 	unionsq
Proof of Proposition 7 It follows from q1(β1) < e1(q2(α2)), that the best replies of
players 1 and 2 intersect when e2(q1 (β1)) ≤ q2 ≤ e2(q1(α1)) and e1(q2 (β2)) ≤
q1 ≤ e1(q2(α2)). This together with (5) implies that the set of Nash equilibria is given
by (6). 	unionsq
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